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ABSTRACT
Anonymity systems such as Tor aim to enable users to com-
municate in a manner that is untraceable by adversaries that
control a small number of machines. To provide efficient
service to users, these anonymity systems make full use of
forwarding capacity when sending traffic between interme-
diate relays. In this paper, we show that doing this leaks in-
formation about the set of Tor relays in a circuit (path). We
present attacks that, with high confidence and based solely
on throughput information, can (a) reduce the attacker’s un-
certainty about the bottleneck relay of any Tor circuit whose
throughput can be observed, (b) exactly identify the guard
relay(s) of a Tor user when circuit throughput can be ob-
served over multiple connections, and (c) identify whether
two concurrent TCP connections belong to the same Tor
user, breaking unlinkability. Our attacks are stealthy, and
cannot be readily detected by a user or by Tor relays. We
validate our attacks using experiments over the live Tor net-
work. We find that the attacker can substantially reduce
the entropy of a bottleneck relay distribution of a Tor cir-
cuit whose throughput can be observed—the entropy gets
reduced by a factor of 2 in the median case. Such in-
formation leaks from a single Tor circuit can be combined
over multiple connections to exactly identify a user’s guard
relay(s). Finally, we are also able to link two connections
from the same initiator with a crossover error rate of less
than 1.5% in under 5 minutes. Our attacks are also more
accurate and require fewer resources than previous attacks
on Tor.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of sophisticated monitoring technolo-
gies [2,3] coupled with coordination within governments and
across businesses to exchange and mine information, com-
munication on the Internet is increasingly becoming less pri-
vate. At the same time, advancing use and pervasiveness of
networks have increased the danger of misuse of that infor-
mation, leading to potential invasions of user privacy, and
fear of retribution against whistleblowers, unofficial leaks,
and political activists. To counter this threat, anonymous
communication systems such as Babel [22], Mixmaster [35],
and Mixminion [14] improve anonymity by routing commu-
nication through an overlay network that masks identities of
the endpoints. However, these systems work by introducing
large and variable latencies between the endpoints, mak-
ing them unsuitable for interactive applications. To fill this
need, low-latency anonymous communication services like
AN.ON [9], Onion Routing [46], Freedom [6], I2P [28] and
Tor [16] were developed, which forward packets directly over
low-delay circuits. Tor has achieved great success, servicing
hundreds of thousands of users and carrying terabytes of
traffic daily [47], and is currently being used as a crucial ser-
vice by end users, government activists, journalists, as well
as protecting business and military communications [48].
Low-latency anonymous communication networks are more
vulnerable to a global passive adversary than other high-
latency communication designs [12, 13, 35] because timing
attacks can be used to link relayed copies of a communica-
tion stream [45]. Most users, however, are concerned about
less powerful, partial adversaries who can observe (or even
compromise) only a fraction of the network. A typical goal
for low-latency systems is to ensure that an adversary who
observes or controls a fraction f of the network can com-
promise the anonymity of f2 of the flows. The hope is that
making f large would require a high resource expenditure,
especially as networks grow large (e.g., the Tor network had
more than 2 000 active relays with an aggregate bandwidth
of 4Gbps as of May 20111).
Further research has demonstrated that it is not, in fact,
necessary to directly observe the network to learn where a
flow is being forwarded. Instead, probes can be used to test
a flow’s presence at a particular location in the network by
creating an observable interference pattern [11,19,37], or by
otherwise correlating characteristics seen in the anonymous
flow with a particular location [25]. In order to fully under-
stand the risks of using a given anonymity network, it is nec-
essary to understand what types of attacks of this class are
possible and what resources are required for a certain prob-
ability of success. Such understanding will let users make
informed security decisions; for example, a “low-resource”
congestion attack on the Tor network originally proposed
by Murdoch and Danezis in 2005 [37] is no longer consid-
ered practical for the current size of the network without
new techniques to improve its scalability [19]. Users may
also find comfort in the fact that the state-of-the-art attacks
could be detected by Tor clients and relays, as they require
the insertion of interference patterns or malicious content in
flows.
In contrast, we examine a new collection of stealthy at-
tacks on the Tor network that are based on detailed observa-
tions of the throughput of an anonymous flow. We called our
attacks stealthy because, although they sometimes perform
active measurements, they do so by acting as completely or-
dinary Tor clients, and therefore Tor users and relays cannot
reliably detect that an attack is in progress. We observe that
1http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/
the throughput of a Tor flow can be used as a fingerprint of
the bottleneck relay (i.e., the relay with minimal forwarding
capacity in the flow path) used to forward it. By observ-
ing the dynamics of the throughput, it is also possible to
identify when two flows share the same set (or subset) of
relays. We note that in contrast to prior work, our attacks
do not require the adversary to insert interference patterns
or other malicious content in flows, and are thus not observ-
able by a user/relay. We also perform a detailed study of
how the throughput of the anonymous flow is influenced by
scheduling, flow-control, and congestion-control algorithms
at both the transport (i.e., TCP) and application (i.e., Tor)
layer. We use the effects of these algorithms to design a pas-
sive attack that can show whether two flows share the same
circuit and thus originate from the same user. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study of flow throughput
based attacks on Tor. Overall, our study demonstrates at-
tacks that use threat models and resource requirements that
differ significantly from attacks using other flow features. It
also highlights the complexity of designing anonymous com-
munication systems by demonstrating the impact that ar-
chitectural and implementation decisions can have on the
security of the system.
1.1 Overview of Attacks
Information leakage via circuit throughput: We
show that it is possible to exploit heterogeneity of through-
put of Tor relays to learn information about which relays
used to forward a given stream. In particular, two circuits
that share the same bottleneck relay will have highly cor-
related throughput. Thus, by forming one-hop probe cir-
cuits through all of the Tor relays, it is possible to gain
some (probabilistic) information about the bottleneck re-
lay of any Tor stream whose throughput can be observed.
This observation also reveals some information about other
relays forwarding the stream, since their observed one-hop
throughput must be higher than the bottleneck. We per-
formed our attacks on a subset of the live Tor network, and
found that we were able to effectively reduce the entropy of
the bottleneck relay distribution. Using this information,
we were able to uncover the identities of the guard relay (the
first relay in the path) over multiple connection attempts.
We note that while learning a user’s relays is not sufficient
by itself to compromise the user identity in Tor, our attacks
serve as a stepping stone for completely de-anonymizing the
user; for example, several attacks in the literature rely on a
user’s guard relays being known to the adversary [11,24,25].
We also show that our attacks can also be applied to de-
anonymize location hidden services that act as Tor relays.
Stream linkability attack: We show that throughput
characteristics of two streams that are multiplexed over the
same circuit have a unique characteristic: throughput of
each stream repeatedly drops to zero during mutually ex-
clusive periods of time, leading to a strong negative corre-
lation. Thus if a client is communicating over Tor with two
servers simultaneously, and if the servers collude, then they
can reliably infer that they are communicating with the same
client. Our experimental results indicate that after roughly
5 minutes of observations the attacker could reliably (with a
crossover error rate of less than 1.5%) identify if the streams
have been multiplexed over a common circuit. This is a sig-
nificant improvement of the latency-based stream linking at-
tack by Hopper et al. [24], which had a crossover error rate
of 17% and required malicious content to be inserted into
web pages.
We have validated all of our attacks using experiments
over the live Tor network. Our source code and analysis
scripts are available at our project webpage [1].
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. We present an overview of low-latency anonymity
systems and discuss related attacks in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3 we show that there is a high degree of heterogeneity
in observed circuit throughput in the Tor network, and that
circuit throughput can be used to reduce the entropy of the
corresponding Tor relays. We also present several statis-
tical disclosure attacks based on information leakage from
circuit throughput to uncover the identities of guard relays
and relays that offer location-hidden services. We present
our passive stream linkability attack in Section 4. Finally,
we discuss the implications of our attacks in Section 5 and
conclude in Section 6.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We start by discussing work on designing low-latency anony-
mous communication systems. We then describe three key
attacks on these systems: side channel attacks, latency at-
tacks, and long-term attacks.
2.1 Tor Background
Tor [16] is a popular low-latency anonymous communica-
tion system. Deployed in 2003, Tor now serves hundreds of
thousands of users and carries terabytes of traffic daily. As
of May 2011, the network comprises more than 2 000 relays.1
Users (clients) download a list of relays from central direc-
tory authorities and build anonymous paths (called circuits)
using onion routing [45]. Tor clients build three-hop circuits
for anonymous communication, where the three relays are
respectively known as guard, middle, and exit relays. The
guard relay is always chosen from a fixed set of three re-
lays that is unique to each client, to prevent certain long
term attacks on anonymous communication [49,50].In order
to balance the load on the network, clients select Tor relays
in proportion to their bandwidths (subject to certain con-
straints). A Tor client can multiplex individual TCP connec-
tions (called streams) over a single Tor circuit. The lifetime
of a Tor circuit is generally set to 10 minutes. Finally, in
addition to anonymous communication, Tor also provides
support for location-hidden services; clients can connect to
these services without knowing their network identity. We
refer the interested reader to [16] for a more detailed de-
scription of Tor.
2.2 Tor Security
Traditional security analyses of Tor [16] assume that a user
who controls (or observes) a fraction f of the network can
compromise the anonymity of f2 of all tunnels by end-to-
end timing analysis (by observing the entry and exit point
of a stream). Note that due to bandwidth-weighted relay
selection, f is best thought of as the fraction of Tor band-
width controlled or observed by an adversary. This sim-
ple model, however, abstracts away many important prop-
erties of the system that affect anonymity; recent research
has shown that, when these properties are properly con-
sidered, the potential for anonymity compromise is signifi-
cantly greater than predicted by the model. Some examples
of such properties include the reliability of relays [10], the
skew of the internal system clocks [36] and the topology of
the underlying Internet paths used to forward traffic between
relays [17, 20, 38]. A particular class of attacks uses side-
channel information to determine whether an anonymous
flow is forwarded by a particular Tor relay [7,11,19,24,37];
this effectively increases the fraction of the network that is
observed (f) with a moderate resource expenditure. As our
attacks fall into the same class, we next discuss these attacks
in detail.
2.3 Circuit Clogging Attacks
Murdoch and Danezis [37] proposed an attack on the Tor
network where an adversary aims to identify the Tor relays
of a circuit by modulating the sending rate of traffic through
a circuit, and studying the effect of the modulations on the
latency characteristics (queueing delay) of individual Tor re-
lays. A high correlation between the two indicates that the
Tor relay is likely part of the original circuit. The attacks
were tested in 2005, when the Tor network comprised only
a handful of relays. Since 2005, the Tor network has grown
in size by two orders of magnitude and Evans et al. [19] re-
cently showed that the Murdoch–Danezis attack no longer
works on the Tor network.
Evans et al. [19] proposed a variant of the Murdoch–
Danezis attack where an adversary sets up a very long path
through the Tor network, consisting of loops, such that the
additional traffic introduced by an adversary gets amplified
(in order to effectively congest a relay). There exist sim-
ple countermeasures to such an amplification attack, like
imposing a bound on the maximum circuit length in Tor.
Houmansadr and Borisov [26] also show that attempts to cir-
cumvent the bound by having the flow exit the Tor network
and then re-enter it (by the means of forwarding proxies)
can be mitigated using watermarking schemes. Note that
without the ability to amplify traffic, significant resources
are required in order to congest a relay.
Chakravarty et al. [11] proposed another variant of the
Murdoch–Danezis attack in which an attacker modulates
traffic rates of a circuit, and uses estimation tools to observe
changes in forwarding capacity of Tor relays. In theory, their
approach also allows the identification of Internet links used
to carry an anonymous flow, with the potential to identify
the identity of the Tor client. The attack, however, requires
an extensive infrastructure of vantage points and maps of
Internet topologies to be fully effective. Furthermore, the
experimental evaluation of the attack showed only moder-
ate success rates even under controlled settings; we expect
this is because modulation of circuit rates does not have any
impact on the forwarding capacity of nodes/links that are
already operating at full capacity (such as some Tor relays).
Note that all of these attacks rely on coarse-grained effects
of active modulation of circuit traffic. One mitigation for
this attack approach is to reduce or eliminate the ability of
two circuits to interfere with each other’s performance by
altering the packet scheduling algorithms used by Tor [33].
2.4 Latency Observations
Hopper et al. [24,25] studied information leaks in Tor that
arise due to heterogeneous network latency. By measuring
the round-trip times through a Tor circuit (using malicious
JavaScript content inserted into web pages), it is possible
to compute the likelihood of it following a particular path
through the Tor network and eliminate some paths from con-
sideration entirely. Additionally, it may be possible to learn
information about the approximate geographic location of
the client. Some of our attack scenarios are similar in spirit,
but our attacks focus on throughput, rather than latency;
in the stream linkability attack, we find that this results in
significantly better accuracy.
A major limitation of circuit-clogging and latency attacks
is that they are not stealthy; the traffic modulations and ma-
licious content insertions can easily be detected by clients/Tor
relays. In contrast, our attacks use finer-grained information
about circuit throughput that can be obtained by a simple
download through Tor, without actively modulating circuit
traffic. Thus, our attacks are stealthy and cannot be de-
tected by Tor relays and clients. Our techniques also enlarge
the scope of possible threat models under which an attacker
can perform traffic analysis. For example, prior attacks are
only applicable to the scenarios where either the destination
web server or the exit relay is compromised. In contrast,
our attacks can be carried out by ISPs or other local traffic
observers. Finally, the finer-grained information also allows
us to achieve better accuracy while using fewer resources.
2.5 Long-Term Anonymity
If multiple communication rounds can be linked (e.g., if
a user logs in frequently with a given pseudonym), the ano-
nymity guarantees provided will degrade over time. For ex-
ample, using the f2 probability of circuit compromise, over
a number of path reformulations, the chance that at least
one tunnel will be observed at both the entry and exit ap-
proaches one [49, 50].This observation, along with attacks
that can force reformulations to occur [4,10,39], motivates
the use of guard relays in Tor, where each client uses a small
fixed set of entry points into the network.
A similar degradation can be observed in mix-based sys-
tems, where observations of the set of active users [8,42] or
senders and recipients [30] at each communication round al-
lows the use of intersection attacks to narrow down the set
of potentially communicating parties. A statistical version
of this attack (statistical disclosure attack) was proposed by
Danezis [13]. Similarly, information learned by observing the
throughput of circuits can be used for a statistical disclosure
attack, as we discuss in Section 3.
3. INFORMATION LEAKAGE VIA
CIRCUIT THROUGHPUT
We next describe attacks on Tor that determine path in-
formation about a pair of circuits by correlating their ob-
served throughput. We first motivate our approach by not-
ing that the capacities of Tor relays are quite heterogeneous
(Section 3.1). We then present an attack to determine if
two circuits share a common sub-path (Section 3.2), and an
attack to narrow in on which relays a given circuit traverses
(Section 3.3). We combine these probabilistic observations
over multiple circuit reformulations to de-anonymize guard
relays (Section 3.4). Finally, we show the applicability of
our attack on interactive traffic (Section 3.6).
3.1 Heterogeneity in the Tor Network
One fundamental observation used in our attacks is that
the Tor network is composed of relays that have heteroge-
neous capacities. Figure 1 plots the advertised capacities of
2 104 Tor relays, collected from the Tor directory service.
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Figure 1: Observed capacity/throughput hetero-
geneity in the Tor network.
These capacity values are estimates based on the minimum
of the maximum input or output bandwidth sustained over
any ten second period at a particular Tor relay. This value
is re-evaluated each day by every Tor relay and reported to
the directory service. This information can be fetched using
the getinfo desc/all-recent command. By analyzing these
capacity values we can see that there is a significant degree
of heterogeneity in the capacities of the Tor relays.
From Figure 1, we can see that around 38.6% of these Tor
relays have capacity (plotted on a log scale) below 100KBps.
This increases the probability of the Tor network being the
bottleneck for most of the flows passing through Tor and
makes it vulnerable to our attacks.
In order to balance the load on the network, Tor clients
select relays in proportion to their capacities. Let Ci de-
note the capacity of relay i. If there are X circuits be-
ing constructed in the network, then the expected number
of circuits that choose any particular relay i is given by
Xi = 3 ·X
Ci
ΣiCi
(there is a factor of 3 because the Tor path
consists of 3 relays). The capacity of relay i should be dis-
tributed evenly amongst circuits that traverse it, given by
Ci
Xi
= ΣiCi
3·X
. Thus we can see that in an ideal scenario, the
throughput received by all circuits should be homogeneous.2
Unfortunately, this is not the situation in the current Tor
network. In spite of load balancing, there exists a large
range of throughput that individual relays can sustain, as
shown in Figure 1. To measure this, we individually probed
the throughput of each available Tor relay using a 3-hop
circuit with our own guard and exit relay. We used the
stable version of Tor (Version 0.2.1.26, as of November 2010)
to do the probing. We used two custom-built TCP client and
server programs (details of these programs are presented in
Section 3.2) to set up a flow through the relay being probed
(using it as the middle relay). We ran both the client and
the server programs at the same machine where the server
sent data to the client as fast as possible (only limited by
TCP’s congestion control mechanism). We measured the
throughput of the flow as observed by the client. Each relay
was probed for 15 seconds, and we computed the average
observed throughput over the last 10 seconds to avoid TCP’s
slow-start effect. As we probed each relay one by one, the
entire experiment took about 18 hours to complete. Note
that we chose a high capacity vantage point to perform this
experiment so that it did not become the bottleneck. We
2This is a slight simplification; some relays cannot be in the
first or third position, and those that can are underweighted
when selecting the middle relay.
were able to probe 2 104 out of 2 429 relays listed in the Tor
network consensus on July 24, 2011. The remaining 325
relays did not respond to our circuit setup requests as they
may have been offline when they were probed during our
experiment.
There are three key factors that determine the throughput
of a circuit: a) the capacity of the bottleneck relay, b) the
number of active TCP flows between the bottleneck relay
and the next hops and c) the number of other active circuits
multiplexed over the TCP connection that carries the circuit
in question3:
throughput of
circuit i
=
bottleneck relay bandwidth
# of TCP flows× # of circuits in
i’s TCP flow
There are several reasons for the lack of perfect load bal-
ancing in the Tor network: a) the first hop relay is chosen
from a fixed set of three guard relays, b) the last hop is cho-
sen from the set of relays whose exit policy meets the client’s
requirements, c) the peak capacity advertised by a relay is
capped to an arbitrary threshold, d) the clients are not privy
to current levels of traffic in the network, and hence select
relays in a fully decentralized fashion, and e) the clients can-
not predict stream characteristics in advance when selecting
circuits for anonymous communication. We note that most
of these reasons are fundamental limitations for any secure
low-latency anonymity system.
3.2 Circuit-Based Bandwidth Fingerprinting
In this section, we describe an attack that determines
whether two circuits share a common sub-path by “finger-
printing” their communication. We do this by monitoring
their throughput and using a simple statistical test to de-
termine if their throughput is correlated. We consider three
representative experimental scenarios:
All-Common (Figure 2(a)): If two Tor circuits have all re-
lays in common, then the circuit throughput will be highly
correlated. Since all three relays are common in both the
circuits, any variation in the number of TCP flows or for-
warding capacity at a relay will affect the throughput of
both circuits in a similar fashion.
None-Common (Figure 2(b)): If two Tor circuits do not
have any common relays, then the circuit throughput will
not be correlated.
One-Common (Figure 2(c)): If two Tor circuits have at
least one relay in common, but do not have all relays in
common, then there are two cases. If the shared relay is the
bottleneck in both the circuits (One-Common-a), then the
circuit throughput will be highly correlated. If the shared re-
lay is not the bottleneck in both the circuits (One-Common-
b), then changes in its number of TCP flows or forwarding
capacity will not affect the throughput of the two circuits,
and thus their throughput will depend on their respective
bottleneck relays.
We performed experiments on the live Tor network to ver-
ify these observations. We used two client nodes and two
server nodes, located in four separate geographical regions.
On the client machines, we ran the stable version of Tor as
3This formula makes the simplifying assumption that TCP
results in fair sharing of bandwidth between flows. In real-
ity, TCP is only RTT-fair [40]; this difference, however, has
minimal impact on our analysis.
Client
R1 R2 R3
Server1
Attacker Server2
(a)
Client
R1 R2 R3
Server1
Attacker Server2
R4 R6R5
(b)
Client
R1 R2 R3
Server1
Attacker AttackerAttacker
(c)
Figure 2: Experimental scenarios for circuit-based throughput fingerprinting: (a) All-Common: Two circuits
sharing all three Tor relays have similar throughput characteristics. (b) None-Common: Two circuits without
any common Tor relays do not have any similarity in their throughput characteristics. (c) One-Common:
Two circuits with one or two common Tor relays will have similar throughput characteristics but only for the
duration of time in which the common Tor relays are the bottleneck relays in the circuit.
of November 2010 (Version 0.2.1.26). We used the default
path selection in the Tor clients, but turned off the use of
entry guards (by setting UseEntryGuards=0), so that our
clients sample circuits from the space of all possible circuits.
For our experiments with all three common relays, we dis-
abled preemptive circuit setup on the Tor client at the at-
tacker’s machine (using __DisablePredictedCircuits=1).
We used two custom-built TCP programs to work as the
client and server in all of our experiments. The TCP client
is a C program that connects with the TCP server, reads
data sent by the server and computes the throughput of the
flow periodically after a specific measurement interval. It
uses the Tor SOCKS [31] interface to perform download via
Tor. The TCP server is a multithreaded server written in C
that waits for connection requests from clients and once con-
nected sends random bytes to the client as fast as possible.
The sending rate of the server is only limited by the TCP
congestion control algorithm. For simplicity of presentation,
our experiments in this section assume that a user is inter-
ested in bulk data transfer. Our attacks are also applicable
to interactive traffic; we demonstrate this in Section 3.6.
For each experiment, we set up a stream at the honest
client, recorded the circuit that the Tor client assigned to
that stream, and built the same circuit at the attacker’s
client. We used an upper bound of 30 seconds as the syn-
chronization delay, and after this delay, we set up a new
stream at the attacker’s client.
Results for All-Common (Figures 3(a) and 4(a)):
We next present experimental results for the scenario where
all three Tor relays are the same for both circuits. We per-
formed 700 runs of this experiment, between November and
December 2010. We found that the throughput values for
the two circuits were highly correlated, measured using the
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Figure 3(a)
illustrates an instance of this scenario, where correlation is
depicted as a function of time. We also compute the 95%
confidence interval for correlation using Fisher’s Z trans-
form [21]. We can see that after a time duration of 300
seconds, even the lower bound for the confidence interval is
higher than 0.7. Figure 4(a) depicts the fraction of experi-
ments where the correlation value is greater than a threshold
as a function of time. In about 92% of the cases, the corre-
lation was greater than a threshold value of 0.5 after a time
duration of 300 seconds. Moreover, we can also see that
correlation remains steady with time.
Results for None-Common (Figures 3(a) and 4(b)):
Next, we consider the scenario where two circuits are com-
pletely disjoint. We performed 532 runs of this experiment
in January 2011. In Figure 3(a), we can see that the correla-
tion quickly approaches zero when the two circuits are com-
prised of disjoint relays. Figure 4(b) shows the full results
for this scenario; we can see that in an overwhelming frac-
tion of cases, the correlation quickly drops to zero—only 12
instances out of 532 had a correlation value greater than 0.5
for a time interval of 300 seconds (false positive percentage of
only 2.2%). In our investigation of false positives, we found
that many of the false positive instances occurred due to the
geographic co-location of relays in the two circuits. For ex-
ample, in four instances, the two circuits shared a relay that
was part of the same subnet, like the blutmagie and blut-
magie4 relays. In one instance, the first 16 bits of the IPv4
address of two relays was the same (ctor and cptnemo, both
located in Berlin), while in two other instances, IP geoloca-
tion databases indicate geographic closeness within tens of
miles. However, geographic colocation could not explain the
remaining five instances.
Results for One-Common-a (Figures 3(b) and 4(c)):
Finally, we consider the scenario where two circuits have
only a single common Tor relay. We build one-hop circuits
through each of the relays in a client circuit. We performed
190 runs of this experiment for this scenario between Novem-
ber 2010 and February 2011. Figure 3(b) depicts the cor-
relation as a function of time for two instances in this sce-
nario. In scenario One-Common-a, the common relay was
the bottleneck relay for the full duration of 10 minutes, and
we can see that the correlation value is similar to that of
scenario All-Common. On the other hand, in scenario One-
Common-b, the common relay was not the bottleneck relay,
and we can see that the correlation is not statistically signif-
icant. When only a single relay is common between two cir-
cuits, we found that in many instances, correlation degrades
over time, since the common relay may be a bottleneck only
temporarily (not shown in Figure 3(b)). To address this is-
sue, we modified the correlation analysis to consider windows
(intervals) of time; for a particular size of the window, we
compute the maximum correlation in the data over all time
intervals greater than the window size (if the communica-
tion duration is smaller than the window size, we compute
correlation as before). We probed all three relays for a
client circuit in this experiment, but since only one of them
may be the bottleneck at a time, we computed the maximum
correlation amongst the three probes for different commu-
nication duration values. Figure 4(c) depicts the fraction of
experiments that have correlation greater than a threshold
value for different communication durations using a window
size of 200 seconds. We can see that while correlation is not
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Figure 3: (a) When the two circuits share all three relays (All-Common), the correlation is very high. When
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Figure 4: Effect of correlation threshold on detection rate: (a) All-Common, (b) None-Common, (c) One-
Common-a.
as high as the scenario where all three relays were common
between two circuits, over 90% and 80% of the experiments
still have correlation greater than 0.3 and 0.4 respectively
after 300 seconds of communication. Next, we will use this
observation to identify Tor relays.
Based on these experiments, we conclude that high cor-
relation between circuit throughput indicates the presence
of common Tor relay(s) in the two circuits. Note that the
converse is not necessarily true.
3.3 Identifying Tor Relays
Threat model: Next, we present an attack where we try
to identify one or more Tor relays being used by a particu-
lar flow. We call this flow the target flow. This flow can be
any flow initiated by a Tor client over the Tor network to
access a resource present at a particular server. We assume
that the attacker can observe the throughput of the target
flow. The attacker could have compromised the exit relay,
the target web server, or the ISP forwarding the data; note
that the attacker does not need to perform any modifica-
tions to the flow. The attacker tries to achieve its goal by
probing different Tor relays; importantly, these probes can
be launched from different vantage points than the target
server. It builds one-hop circuits through these relays (Fig-
ure 5) and computes correlations between the throughput of
the target flow and the probe flows. If the throughput of a
probe flow is highly correlated with that of the target flow,
then the server can assume that both the flows are actually
Client
R1 R2 R3
Server1
Attacker AttackerAttacker
Figure 5: Identifying Tor relays attack: localizing
which Tor relays are on a path by exploiting circuit
throughput characteristics. Observe that the attack
cost scales as O(N).
traversing a common Tor relay. In this section, we show the
success of the attacker at identifying Tor relays by running
experiments over the live Tor network.
Experimental setup: In an ideal setting, the attacker
will try to probe every relay in the Tor network and find
the correlation between the probe flows and the target flow.
However, in order to reduce the amount of resources required
to perform this attack, we used a smaller set of 25 Tor relays
for constructing circuits. To pick relays that are represen-
tative of the current Tor network, we selected relays with a
probability proportional to their bandwidth using the Tor
client. We performed our experiments during two differ-
ent time period and used a different set of 25 relays in each
period; we will refer to them as RELAY-SET-1 and RELAY-
SET-2 (the list of Tor relays is available in Appendix A.)
Probe locations: We used 25 different Emulab [18] ma-
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Figure 6: (a) Entropy of the anonymity set obtained through our de-anonymizing relay attack. (b) Entropy
loss and CDF of observed throughput. (c) Decrease in entropy over six consecutive ten second intervals.
chines at the University of Utah to run the probe flows.4
They were used to probe all the 25 Tor relays simultane-
ously. All of the probe flows originated from a single physical
location, but we expect that their throughput was neverthe-
less shaped by the Tor overlay, rather than the access link:
in a separate test, we were able to achieve 70Mbps across
the access link, far above the throughput of flows in the Tor
network.
Single circuit experiments: In our first experiment, we
set up a target flow between a client and a malicious server
over a circuit that was constructed using a set of 25 Tor
relays. We started all the probe flows simultaneously after
the target flow ran for 50 seconds. Each probe flow lasted for
600 seconds, and we recorded the observed throughput every
0.1 seconds. Overall, we performed 40 measurements using
RELAY-SET-1 in November 2010 and 150 measurements
using RELAY-SET-2 in January-February 2011.
We use the entropy metric [15,43] (with a uniform prior)
to quantify the attacker’s uncertainty about the relays in a
circuit (our computations are described in Appendix B).
Figure 6(a) depicts the CDF of the bottleneck relay entropy
for varying window sizes using a correlation threshold of 0.4.
We can see that while our attacks are not able to exactly
identify the bottleneck relay, the bottleneck relay entropy
is still drastically reduced. For example, using a window
size of 300 seconds, the entropy in half of the cases is less
than 2.5 bits (out of 4.6 bits). We found similar results for
correlation thresholds 0.3 and 0.5.
In addition to being able to reduce the entropy of the
bottleneck relay distribution, we can also learn some infor-
mation about the target flow’s non-bottleneck relays. Our
attack observation is that if the mean throughput of a one-
hop probe through a relay is less than the mean throughput
of the target flow, then that relay is unlikely to be part of the
target flow circuit. The expected drop in entropy for a given
throughput is shown in Figure 6(b). We also plot the CDF of
Tor circuit throughput for comparison. We can see that the
circuits receiving a higher throughput have a lower entropy
in the network. This is due to the presence of only a few
high-throughput relays in the system; if high throughput is
achieved, there are only a limited number of relays capable
of providing this service. The average value of through-
put observed in our experiment was 96KBps thus yielding
an expected instantaneous drop of about 18% in the total
4Note that we did not make use of Emulab’s network emu-
lation infrastructure and ran experiments on the production
Tor network instead.
entropy at any given point in the experiment’s run time.
We demonstrate the usefulness of this observation by elim-
inating relays with lower throughput than the target flow
over a period of time. The results are plotted in Figure 6(c).
By using this simple technique, we were able to reduce the
entropy in our sample space by roughly 40% in the first ten
seconds, and using a minute-long attack, we were able to
reduce the entropy the bottleneck relay’s sample space by
roughly 45% as fluctuating probe bandwidth measurements
allowed more relays to be eliminated from consideration.
3.4 Identifying Guard Relays
So far, we presented attacks that reduce the entropy of Tor
relays in a single circuit. We now present attacks that can
combine such probabilistic observations over multiple cir-
cuits, and identify a client’s set of guard relays. Our obser-
vation is that the guard relays are more likely to be present
in the anonymity set of bottleneck relays for a client’s cir-
cuit, as compared to other relays (since the probability of
the guard relays appearing in the client’s circuit is much
higher than other relays). Thus, over multiple circuit refor-
mulations, the set of relays that appear in the anonymity set
for a client’s circuit with the highest frequencies are likely
to be the guard relays.
Experimental setup: Here, in addition to restricting
the client’s Tor application in using relays from a selected
set of 25 relays, we also restricted its choice of guard re-
lay. With the help of the configuration options EntryNodes,
StrictEntryNodes, UseEntryGuards, and NumEntryGuards,
we configured the client’s Tor application to always use a
particular relay as the guard relay. The intuition behind this
experiment is to analyze the vulnerability of using a fixed
guard relay; i.e., we want to observe whether use of a fixed
guard relay allows the attacker to combine probabilistic ob-
servations over multiple circuits and identify the guard relay.
Similar to the experiments for identifying Tor relays, we used
25 different machines to do the probing where the target flow
ran for 700 seconds and the probe flows ran for 600 seconds
(within the lifetime of the target flow). We performed three
experiments for this scenario, where we chose the guard re-
lays to be Fooligans, jalopy, and trusted, respectively.
We performed 50, 20, and 50 runs for the three experiments
respectively, between November 2010 and February 2011.
Note that we considered these three relays since we wanted
to study the effectiveness of our attack against guard re-
lays with very different capacities. Fooligans, jalopy, and
trusted have a reported capacity of 82KBps, 5.8MBps, and
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Figure 7: Number of times a particular relay was detected as a bottleneck, with guard relay (a) Fooligans,
with observed capacity 82KBps, (b) jalopy, with observed capacity 5.8MBps, (c) trusted, with observed
capacity 17.4MBps, as of February 2011.
17.4MBps, respectively (as of February 2011).
Results: Figure 7 show the number of times a particular
relay was selected in the anonymity set for the bottleneck re-
lay used by the target flow. We used a correlation threshold
of 0.4, and set the window size to be 400. In Figure 7(a), we
can see that the relay with the highest frequency of being in
the anonymity set of bottleneck relays is Fooligans, which
is indeed the guard relay for the client. In fact, in all three
experiments, our attack was able to infer the identity of the
guard relays, since they appeared in the anonymity set with
the highest frequencies.
Observe that accounting for the fact that Tor clients use
3 guard relays by default (as compared to one in our exper-
iments) would reduce the frequency of them being detected
as a bottleneck relay by a factor of 3. However, note that
our results are conservative since we selected relays from a
limited pool of only 25 Tor relays. The current Tor net-
work size is about 2 000 relays; application of this attack on
the full Tor network would result in orders of magnitude re-
duction in the selection probability of relays which are not
the guard relay, correspondingly reducing their frequency of
being detected as a bottleneck relay. Thus in the full Tor
network, even with 3 guard relays, we can expect the fre-
quency of the guards being detected as the bottleneck relay
to be much higher than a random relay in the network.
Finally, we note that our attack was able to identify the
guard relay irrespective of its observed capacity. As the Tor
network is heavily used by a large number of users, even high
capacity relays become congested and cannot ensure enough
throughput to all the flows. This causes them to affect flows’
throughput in a way that can be detected through our one-
hop relay identification attack. As the guard relay has a
direct connection with the client, the severity of this attack
is much higher than an attack that identifies the middle
relays.
3.5 De-anonymizing Tor Relays Offering
Location Hidden Service
In this section, we attempt to identify Tor relays that also
offer location hidden services. The main purpose of a lo-
cation hidden service is to remain anonymous while serving
its clients. However, we show that when a Tor relay offers
a location hidden service, it becomes susceptible to attacks.
The observation that enables de-anonymization of location
hidden servers is similar to our attack on guard relays, in
that the location hidden service is likely to have the highest
frequency of being part of the anonymity set of bottleneck
relays for circuits connecting to that location hidden service.
In order to assess the effectiveness of this attack, we set up
our own Tor relay and advertised its existence to the Tor
network. We also configured this machine to offer a location
hidden service. We setup a target flow from a client ma-
chine to the location hidden service, and measured the flow
throughput. While this target flow was active, we probed
our Tor relay using a one-hop circuit as we did in Section 3.3.
We ran this experiment 100 times and computed the correla-
tion between the throughput of the target flow and the probe
flows. Using a correlation threshold of 0.4, and window sizes
of 300 and 400 seconds, we found that 15% and 9% of the
target flows and the corresponding probe flows were highly
correlated. Relating this observation with the observations
from Section 3.3, we can conclude that our Tor relay will
be placed in the anonymity set for bottleneck relays with
a much higher probability than any other relay. Moreover,
as there are usually 8 different relays/nodes including the
server itself (the other seven relays comprise of three relays
each for the client’s circuit as well as the server’s circuit, and
a common meeting point for these circuits, called the ren-
dezvous relay) in the path between the client and the server,
each of them can become the bottleneck with 12.5% prob-
ability. Results from our experiment closely matches this
value by identifying our Tor relay with roughly the same
probability (9%-15%).
3.6 Applicability to Interactive Traffic
So far, we used bulk traffic in our experiments. We now in-
vestigate the accuracy of our attacks with interactive traffic
(characterized by bursts of traffic followed by periods of in-
activity). To evaluate our attacks, we first built a model for
interactive traffic by collecting real packet level traces from
a fast Tor guard relay at various times from April 24 through
April 27. To preserve user privacy, we first used Mittal et
al.’s [34] anonymizing framework to process the pcap traces;
for each observed packet, the output of the framework was
an anonymized client IP address, packet timestamp, and
packet length. We performed the above data anonymiza-
tion and minimization steps on the guard relay itself. The
original pcap traces were deleted immediately afterwards5.
5In future work, we will enhance the anonymizing frame-
work to perform the data minimization and anonymization
steps in memory, in order to further minimize risk in case
the guard relay is compromised during the data processing
phase.
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Figure 8: Attack on interactive traffic: ROC curve.
Next, we analyzed the properties of the processed data.
In total over the three days we observed 19 478 flows with
17 911 of these flows containing between one to ten pack-
ets. We surmise that these correspond to either preemptive
circuits which were never actually used by Tor or failed cir-
cuit creation attempts. For the remaining flows, we break
them up into ten-minute intervals and then calculate the
fraction of 5 second sub-intervals where any traffic was ob-
served. We next classify them into three categories based on
the fraction of time they were observed sending data. We
found 424 flows that transferred traffic for more than 90% of
the time (non-interactive file downloads), 347 flows with be-
tween 50% and 90% utilization (interactive flows with mod-
erate utilization), and 796 flows with less than 50% utiliza-
tion (interactive flows with low utilization). We select only
the flows comprising interactive traffic with moderate uti-
lization, and use the distribution of their average burst sizes
and gap times as a model for interactive traffic in our ex-
periments. After computing the distribution of burst sizes
and gap times, all intermediate data from previous steps was
discarded to maintain the privacy of Tor users.
Next, we performed two experiments over the live Tor
network, with 100 measurements each for the Scenarios All-
Common and None-Common. In both experiments, we set
up a bulk transfer flow (the attacker) and an interactive flow
(the victim). For the interactive transfer, the TCP server
was configured to send data to the victim in bursts where
each burst was followed by a gap period. Both the burst
size and the gap times were sampled from the observed dis-
tribution computed using real data. For both experiments,
we computed the correlation in throughput of the attacker
flow and the victim flow for those time intervals where the
victim flow was active. We are interested in the fraction
of measurements where the correlation was greater than a
threshold. This metric corresponds to true positives for the
Scenario All-Common, and false positives for the Scenario
None-Common. The correlation threshold determines the
trade off between the true positives and the false positives.
Figure 8 depicts the ROC curve for our experiments. We
found that for an estimated false positive rate of 0 (95% con-
fidence interval is less than 3.5%), the true positive rate is
greater than 0.5. Our analysis demonstrates the applicabil-
ity of our attacks on interactive traffic, though the accuracy
in this case is lower than that of bulk traffic.
4. STREAM FINGERPRINTING
Circuits in Tor typically carry multiple streams, which
correspond to individual TCP connections. By default, all
streams created by a client within a 10 minute period are
Alice
R1 R2 R3
Eve1
Eve2
Figure 9: Stream fingerprinting attack: breaking
unlinkability by exploiting stream throughput char-
acteristics.
carried over the same circuit.6 Tor uses a different schedul-
ing mechanism to share bandwidth between streams than
it does between circuits, providing an opportunity for new
attacks that correlate streams. In particular, we will show
that packet scheduling of streams that use the same circuit
creates special characteristics that can easily be recognized
by a completely passive attacker; this can be used to link the
streams as belonging to the same user and thus compromise
some of the unlinkability protections provided by Tor.7
4.1 Stream Throughput at Different Time Scales
Consider the scenario in Figure 9: Alice is communicating
simultaneously with Eve1 and Eve2. Alice’s Tor client mul-
tiplexes both streams over the same circuit, in this case con-
sisting of Tor relays R1, R2, R3. Eve1 and Eve2 can see that
both their connections are coming from the same exit node,
and would like to learn if they are both communicating with
the same person. We would expect that, since the streams
share the same path through the network, they should ex-
hibit similar throughput characteristics. Indeed, we find a
very strong correlation between such streams; Figure 10(a)
shows the results of one experiment, with a correlation of
0.93. However, as shown in Section 3, a high correlation is
common among unrelated circuits that share the same bot-
tleneck node, e.g., if R3 is the bottleneck for both streams.
However, there is a second effect that can be used to dis-
tinguish streams that share one or more common relays.
Tor implements stream-level throttling within circuits. This
end-to-end flow control works as follows: each stream is ini-
tially allowed to send 500 of Tor’s 512-byte cells (also called
the packaging window). Upon successful reception of pack-
ets, the packaging window is incremented in blocks of 50
cells. Observe that if a stream is waiting for the packag-
ing window to be incremented, then another stream that is
being multiplexed on the same circuit can hog the circuit
(batching effect) for a small time interval.
While the streams share the throughput fairly, flow- and
congestion-control mechanisms in Tor result in batching be-
havior, where one stream may monopolize the circuit for
some period of time, while the other streams lie idle. We
can see this mutually exclusive use of the circuit by two
streams when we sample the throughput at smaller time
scales, as can be seen in Figures 10(b) and 10(c). We note
that the length of the batches seems to be a multiple of
25KB, corresponding to 50 of Tor’s 512-byte cell, matching
our intuition that 50-cell packaging window increments are
responsible for the batching effect. This also means that
the time scales necessary to observe this effect will vary de-
6This is governed by the Max_Circuit_Dirtiness parameter
in Tor.
7It should be noted that exit relays can already perform such
linking; our attacks, however, do not require the compromise
of any relays in the Tor network.
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Figure 10: (a) Positive correlation between streams. (b) Batching effect when sampling every 0.5 seconds.
(c) Batching effect when sampling every 2 seconds.
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Figure 11: Stream linkability attack: crossover error
rate as a function of time.
pending on the throughput of the flow: in Figure 10(b), the
mean throughput value is 450Kbps and we observe the be-
havior sampling every 0.5 seconds, whereas in Figure 10(c),
the mean throughput value is 66Kbps, and we observe the
behavior sampling every 2 seconds.
Based on these observations, we propose the following al-
gorithm to infer whether the streams are coming from the
same client:
1. We first check for strong correlation at macro-level
time scales, as done in previous sections.
2. We define our micro-level time scale to be 25 KB
Throughput(KBps)
3. We check for the batching effect at micro-level timescales.
Namely, we compute the fraction of time when only
one stream is active out of the total time that either
stream is active, which shows the degree of “mutual
exclusivity” between the two streams.
4.2 Results
To see how well the algorithm works, we performed an
experiment in which a single client connects to two servers
under our control, located in two different geographical lo-
cations, and simultaneously downloads data. Since the con-
nections were made simultaneously, the two streams were
multiplexed over the same Tor circuit. We performed a to-
tal of 225 runs between November 2010 and February 2011.
To check for false positives in our attack, we repeated the
experiment with downloads by two different clients using
separate circuits that have a common exit relay. We per-
formed 225 iterations of this experiment in April 2011.
Recall that the tradeoff between false positives and false
negatives is governed by the choice of the threshold values
for correlation and mutual exclusiveness. As the threshold
values are increased, the false positives decrease, but the
false negatives increase. We plot the crossover error rate as
a function of the communication duration in Figure 11. We
can see that as the time duration is increased, the accuracy
of our attack quickly improves. Even at a small duration of
120 seconds, our mean crossover error rate is less than 5%,
which gets reduced to 1.3% beyond 300 seconds (with a 95%
confidence interval of less than 4%).
Hopper et al. [24] analyzed a similar attack scenario, where
latency information was used to determine if the same client
is communicating with two servers. However, the crossover
error rate in their attack was 17% even when the communi-
cation duration was 10 minutes. Note that throughput and
latency provide orthogonal sources of information, and it
may be interesting to combine our attacks with latency at-
tacks to further improve accuracy. Finally, we also study the
scenario where client Alice is communicating simultaneously
on 3 streams, but only two of the destination endpoints are
colluding. We found that the crossover error rate in this case
was higher than the previous scenario, but still less than 8%
when the communication duration is 300 seconds.
5. DISCUSSION
We discuss some issues and ramifications of our attacks:
Countermeasures: We now consider some possible ways
to defend Tor users against our attacks. First, the circuit
throughput fingerprinting attack relies on the existence of a
shared bottleneck relay along the two paths. One counter-
measure might be to use better load balancing within the
Tor network. For example, preferring paths through higher
capacity relays may make it more likely that the bottle-
neck is outside the Tor network. While it may be difficult
to completely eliminate all bottlenecks within the Tor net-
work, it may be possible to avoid making more sensitive
relays as bottlenecks, for example by setting up paths such
that guard relays are not the bottlenecks. In addition, mul-
tipath forwarding has been shown to give more even load
balance in conventional networks [23]. Using multipath for-
warding could reduce the number of bottlenecks by evenly
distributing traffic over multiple paths, as well as “average
out” short-term variations in throughput that arise from any
single path. Also, since our attacks take some time to reli-
ably associate the circuits, endpoints may periodically cycle
through a small set of circuits, to reduce the amount of time
they spend sharing a bottleneck with a malicious circuit.
Another approach might be to change the effects that the
bottleneck relay has on traffic. For example, relays may
intentionally use an uneven rate allocation across flows, or
inject spurious cross-traffic, to decouple throughput corre-
lations in circuits they carry. Next, the stream linkability
attack is based on Tor’s intra-stream scheduling mechanism.
To avoid this attack, Tor users may wish to perform heuris-
tics at the client side to prevent circuit re-use for sensitive
flows. In addition, better stream multiplexing algorithms [5]
(e.g., algorithms that share bandwidth on a finer granular-
ity) could eliminate the batching effects that we observed.
Alternative schemes to measure throughput: Our
current attacks measure throughput by simply forwarding
TCP traffic through the Tor relays. However, much work
has been done in the networking community in the area of
throughput probing, and it may be possible to leverage these
techniques for improved performance. For example, instead
of just monitoring flow throughput, techniques exist to mon-
itor total capacity of the bottleneck link, by sending pack-
ets with precise timings [27, 29]. In situations where these
techniques can be applied, correlation may be simplified, by
revealing how much total capacity there is in nodes partici-
pating in the underlying channel. In addition, some of these
techniques can measure throughput within short bursts of
packets (e.g., packet pairs and packet trains [27,29]), which
may improve correlation for sessions of short duration.
Alternatives to probing: Our study indicates that through-
put information is sensitive, and can be used to reveal pri-
vate information about clients. This calls into question pro-
posals to make observed bandwidth information public. For
example, there has been work [44] on sharing bandwidth in-
formation between peers, to improve load balancing. In the
context of Tor, the Tor directory service reveals informa-
tion about the bandwidth of relays. There have also been
measurement studies on Tor [32, 41] that have conducted
bandwidth measurements of Tor and released these results
into the public domain, which may reveal information about
Tor users.
Resource requirements: Our primary attacks are stealthy
and do not require the attacker to congest Tor relays. Thus,
the only cost incurred by an attacker is to create circuits
to narrow the set of relays present in a circuit. To get a
loose upper bound on the attacker’s resource requirements,
we note that the average throughput through a Tor relay
from our study of 2,104 relays (Figure 1) is 226KBps. Con-
sider the very extreme case where the attacker simultane-
ously constructs one-hop circuits through each of the Tor
relays in the entire network. The attacker would need to
send 464.36MBps (1632.51 GB per hour) of traffic. While
this amount is higher than typical edge node bandwidth,
the attacker may be able to acquire such bandwidth by us-
ing botnet hosts, or a hosted infrastructure such as Amazon
EC2. Using EC2 pricing of $0.12 per GB, the attacker could
send traffic for one hour with a cost of $196 (volume pric-
ing for bandwidth in EC2 would reduce this cost for longer
monitoring periods).
Impact of bulk traffic throttling: Recently, Tor imple-
mented a mechanism that enables relay operators to throttle
bulk traffic connections using a token bucket rate limiting
system on traffic coming from non-relays. The rate limiting
takes into account the burst rate and the long term through-
put rate of a connection. The mechanism was first imple-
mented in Tor-0.2.2.15-alpha, and thus did not impact our
initial experiments conducted throughout November of 2010.
However, as new versions of Tor were deployed throughout
early 2011, we noticed that some of the attacker’s probe cir-
cuits were getting throttled after roughly 300 seconds of high
rate transfer down to a set limit of about 20KBps. Note that
the attacker can easily overcome the effects of throttling on
its probe circuits by opening a new probe circuit when the
current circuit begins to be throttled.
Ethics: Given that throughput information can leak in-
formation about clients, we conducted our study with some
caution. In our experiments, we only attack the circuits
created by our own experimental tool to avoid collecting in-
formation about non-participating clients. We also avoided
launching large-scale attacks; we focus most of our experi-
ments on only 25 Tor relays. All throughput data we col-
lected was stored with strong encryption on machines be-
hind a firewalled network. While analyzing traffic on a
guard relay, we only recorded data pertaining to the distri-
bution of burst sizes and gap times for the interactive traffic
model (data-minimization). All other collected data (includ-
ing outputs of various intermediate steps) was discarded to
maintain the privacy of Tor users.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To the best of our knowledge, our work comprises the
first study of throughput attacks on anonymity systems. We
presented attacks to identify Tor relays used by an existing
connection, as well as techniques to identify the relationship
between two streams, solely by monitoring their through-
put. This calls into question, existing proposals to make ob-
served bandwidth information public [32, 41, 44]. Our tech-
niques are stealthy (cannot be detected by Tor users/relays)
and low cost (do not require Tor relays to be congested).
Moreover, our attacks use threat models and resource re-
quirements that differ significantly from attacks using other
flow features. Overall, our study highlights the complexity
of designing anonymous communication systems.
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APPENDIX
A. RELAYS USED IN EXPERIMENTS
RELAY-SET-1 RELAY-SET-2
bach $70DB...80A4
BelieveInGood agate
blutmagie bach
BostonUCompSci blutmagie
CompSciR0x blutmagie4
customer0648f5 CB3ROB
DieYouRebelScum1 chaoscomputerclub42
fejk4 F00DD00D
FoeBuD3 Fooligans
gatereloaded $2EE8...448E
gotrootmeuk1 gam
HORNET gatereloaded
hottuna gotrootmeuk1
jalopy jalopy
mitternacht Mischmaschine
murble2 myrnaloy
myrnaloy PPrivCom028
nixnix PPrivCom052
pansenserver Qwerty
Pasquino shiven
PeaShooter TORy0
PPrivCom024 traktor
Roo8Peik trusted
SunnySmile VHS
torforpresident williamhaines
Table 1: Tor relays used in the probe experiments.
B. ENTROPY METRIC
This metric considers the distribution of potential relays
in a circuit, as computed by attackers, and computes its
entropy:
H(C) = −
∑
c
pc log2 pc (1)
where pc is the probability that the relay c was part of the
circuit. Under some observation o, we can compute the prob-
ability distribution given o and compute the corresponding
entropy H(C|o). To model the entropy of the system as a
whole, we compute a weighted average of the entropy for
each observation (including the null observation):
H(C|O) =
∑
o
P (o)H(C|o) (2)
where P (o) is the probability of the observation o occurring,
and O is the set of all observations. This is also known as
the conditional entropy of C based on observing O. Now, let
S be the set of relays for which the one-hop probes have high
correlation with the target flow. Also, let P (RS) denote the
probability that the correct relay is included in the set S.
The attacker can compute H(C|S) as follows:
H(C|S) = P (RS) log2
|S|
P (RS)
+(1−P (RS)) log2
|N − S|
1− P (RS)
(3)
